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ABSTRAl T
Economic models of bargaining theory provide quantitative predictions of the ultimate outcomes of
bargaining without explicit consideration of social-psychological factors. On the other hand, the social-
psychological studies of bargaining show that various social-psychological factors are influential in changing
bargaining behaviors and outcomes, yet the approach can not be used to locate the ultimate bargaining outcomes.
Moreover, recent studies in marketing have shown that the accuracy of the Nash solution, the well known
economic model of bargaining, in predicting the outcomes of buyer-seller bargaining is limited.
The author applies an economic model, the Cross model, which can generate a more general solution
than the famous Nash solution. Furthermore, through concession rates and discount rates, the Cross model can
be linked to five crucial social-psychological factors, namely, perceived relative power, organizational monitoring,
tough self-image, time pressure, and risk-taking propensity. Hence, in this study the authors propose an
integrated model of bargaining incorporating the Cross model and five important social-psychological factors.
The integrated model is more complete and thus has the potential for higher predictive power than those
based on either approach alone. The model was operationalized and tested in an experiment simulating industrial
buyer-seller bargaining in the laboratory setting. Empirical results generally support the integrated model. The
theoretical contributions as well as several potential managerial implications of this integrated model, along with
the limitations and further research opportunities, are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
There are two major theoretical approaches to the study of bargaining, the economic approach and the
social-psychological approach (Young 1975; Rubin and Brown 1975; Druckman 1977; Carnevale and Pruitt 1992).
The economic approach is most devoted to the rule of dividing the surplus. Many game-theoretical models and
economic models of bargaining have been proposed to provide different rules of dividing the surplus; hence, they
also provide quantitative predictions of the outcomes of bargaining (e.g., Nash 1950; Kalai & Smorodinsky 1975;
Roth 1985). On the other hand, social-psychological studies of bargaining analyze the strengths and directions
of the effects of such social-psychological factors as power, motivation, personality, time pressure on the
bargaining process and the changes of outcomes (Rubin and Brown 1975; Druckman 1977; Pruitt 1981;
Carnevale and Pruitt 1992).
These two approaches to the study of bargaining, however, have been developed independently. While
economists recognize the importance of social-psychological factors in bargaining, no social-psychological factors
have been explicitly modeled in the bargaining models based on economic approach (Young 1975; Roth 1985).
Moreover, recent studies in marketing have shown that the accuracy of the Nash solution, the most well known
bargaining model of the economic approach, in predicting the outcomes of buyer-seller bargaining, is limited
(Neslin and Greenhalgh 1983, 1986; Gupta and Livne 1989). At the same time, the social-psychological
approach has shown that numerous factors, (such as relative power and time pressure) influence the bargaining
process as well as the outcomes (Rubin and Brown 1975; Carnevale and Pruitt 1992). But, this approach alone
can not be used to locate the ultimate outcomes.
Given the strengths and weaknesses of these two approaches, and the complementary relationship
between them, this paper presents and tests an economic bargaining model that incorporates social-psychological
factors and, thus, is more complete and has potential for higher predictive power than a model based on one
perspective alone. Through a literature review, the author identifies an economic bargaining model, the Cross
model (Cross 1977, 1969, 1965), which can yield a solution more general than the Nash solution. The Cross
model, through its concession rates and discount rates, is then connected to five crucial social-psychological
factors - perceived relative power, organizational monitoring, bargainer's tough self-image, time pressure, and
risk-taking propensity.
The major objectives of this study are: (1) To propose a comprehensive model which incorporates the
strengths of both the economic and the social-psychological approaches of bargaining to better predict bargaining
outcomes in the presence of the asymmetries of several crucial social-psychological factors. (2) To test theory
to see <A> whether the various social-psychological factors affect concession rates and discount rates in the
manner predicted, and <B> whether considering concession rates and discount rates can improve on the Nash
solution in bargaining games.
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION
The economic approach includes both game-theoretic models of bargaining and economic models of
bargaining (Young 1975; Harsanyi 1977). On the other hand, the impact of social-psychological factors on
bargaining have been discussed in the social-psychology literature (e.g., Rubin and Brown 1975; Druckman 1977;
Pruitt 1981), and in several studies in the marketing literature (e.g., Dwyer & Walker 1981; Schurr & Ozanne
1985). A brief review of the relevant literature is provided here to show the theoretical foundation of an
integrated model.
(1) Game-theoretic Models of Bargaining
Most game-theoretic models of bargaining focus on predicting the ultimate outcome of bargaining
(Young 1975). In the industrial marketing context, buyer-seller bargaining involving two parties trying to
maintain a long-term relationship is the most common situation (Neslin and Greenhalgh 1983). Therefore, the
game-theoretic models of bargaining to be discussed here are limited to two-person cooperative games. 1
Perhaps the most prominent contributions in the traditional game-theoretic literature on cooperative
bargaining are made by Nash (1950, 1953), Raiffa (1953), Harsanyi (1956, 1977), Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975),
Kalai (1977), and Roth (1979a, 1979b). More recent developments have been made by Rubinstein (1982), Roth
(1985), Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986), Anbarci and Bigelow (1988), Harsanyi and Selton (1988),
Gupta and Livne (1988), and Gupta (1989). Among all of these, Nash's theory is the most parsimonious, yet it
is powerful enough to justify a rule of dividing the surplus hence to predict the rational, reasonable solution for
most cooperative games (Friedman 1985; Eliashberg et. al., 1986). Many recently developed models are based
on Nash's theory (Rubinstein 1982; Binmore et. al., 1986). Therefore, a summary of Nash's theory is presented
to serve as a comparison model for the subsequent discussion.
Nash's Theory
In the 2-person game theory, given the set of bargainers' utility functions for all the potential outcomes,
Nash (1950) concludes that the appropriate bargain is the one that maximizes the product of their utility
increments from the no-settlement point (also called threat point). This conclusion follows from certain
axiomatic assumptions (Nash 1950; Bishop 1963; Harsanyi 1977; Neslin & Greenhalgh 1983), namely, rationality,
Pareto optimality, independence of utility function scale
,
independence of irrelevant alternatives, and symmetry
axioms.
In mathematical terms, the Nash bargaining problem can be specified as the bargainers act to maximize
the following objective function (setting the threat point at the origin of the coordinates):
MAX. U
t
*U 2 (1)
subject to the condition that utility-pairs (U,
,
U2 ) belong to the set of all the possible outcomes.
The solution is dU
t / dU2 = -U, / U2 (2)
Geometrically, when the utility possibilities frontier tangentially intersects a utility-product-indifferent
curve (U,*U 2 = k), the utility possibilities frontier reaches the maximum utility-product-indifferent curve it can
possibly be. And the slopes of these two curves will be the same at the tangentially intersected point, which is
the solution point. This solution represents the only settlement that satisfies all five of the axiomatic conditions
and is usually called the "Nash solution".
The Nash solution requires only the bargainers' utility functions to predict bargaining outcomes.
Therefore, two limitations exist: <1> the Nash solution does not handle all those factors which can not be
captured by the utility functions, such as most social-psychological factors; <2> the symmetry axiom restricts
the Nash solution from handling asymmetry problems, such as asymmetries of power, and of bargainers'
individual differences. To ease the asymmetry problems, Roth (1979b) proposed an asymmetric Nash model
presented in mathematic terms as follows:
MAX. U, p * U 2 (2p) where < = p < = 2 (3)
and the solution is
dU, / dU 2 = -(U, / U2 ) * (2-p) / p (4)
A larger exponent p is interpreted as representing a relatively high bargaining power of bargainer 1. However,
Roth's (1979b) modified model does not provide theoretical insight into how such asymmetry of power is formed.
Besides, problem < 1 > , cited above, remains a major weakness of the Nash solution since this problem has not
been explicitly dealt with in the existing literature.
Recently, Nash's theory has received a few empirical tests in the marketing context (Neslin and
Greenhalgh 1983, 1986; Eliashberg et. al. 1986). Although the results, in general, support the Nash solution,
Neslin and Greenhalgh's (1986) result shows that the accuracy of the Nash solution in predicting the outcomes
of buyer-seller bargaining is still low (57.8% of the dyads did not achieve the Nash solution).
(2) Economic Models of Bargaining
Although game-theoretic models have been able to predict the likely ultimate outcome of bargaining
and some recently developed models also explicitly incorporate the dynamic bargaining process (e.g.,
Rubinstein, 1982), none of them depict the concession mechanism of bargaining. As suggested by Young (1975),
there are several models in the field of economics which are relevant to the analysis of bargaining as a method
of achieving negotiated settlements under conditions of strategic interaction. The economic models depict
bargaining as a procedure involving bargainers with conflicting interests and/or incomplete information
attempting to achieve a mutually acceptable agreement through a strategy of demands and concessions that
communicates each party's interests (Young 1975).
There are several economic models of bargaining (Zeuthen 1930; Pen 1952; Richardson 1960b; Cross
1977, 1969, 1965). Among them, the Cross model (1977, 1969, 1965) has been widely considered to be
imaginative, rigorous, and has provided the basis for useful work both in theory development and in
experimentation on the subject of bargaining (Zartman 1977: p73). Bartos (1974) also indicates that Cross's
model is very promising and that serious consideration should be given to this model as a theory of bargaining.
More importantly, the Cross model can generate a solution that is more general than the Nash solution. That
is because the Cross solution explicitly considers the asymmetries of the bargainers' concession rates and
discount rates while the Nash solution does not.
The Cross Model
The Cross model emphasizes the roles of learning and time as two important factors in bargaining and
conceptualizes the process of making concessions in terms of the adjustment of expectations through learning.
In the Cross (1977, 1969) model, the individual bargainer starts the bargaining by calculating:
(1) a specification of his own preference ordering for the outcomes in the payoff possibility set (i.e.,
forming each bargainer's utility, U, or preference as a function of payoffs, q,: U, = f,(q,));
(2) an estimate of the other bargainer's concession rate over time (r^t)); and
(3) a schedule of costs (Zt) arising from the time that elapses before a specific contract is agreed upon. The
sum of these costs Z, , extended to the expected time of agreement, may be expressed in present utility
value as:
Z, = L, ;o
w
' e
D* dx = L, / D, * (1 - e D '
Wi
) (5)
where L, is bargainer i's fixed cost, expressed in utility units, in each time period, Dj is his discount
rate, and w
{
= (qj + q2 - M) / r. is the expected time necessary to reach agreement such that
bargainer i receives a payoff q„ and M is the total objective quantity available.2
Given this information, each bargainer proceeds to calculate the optimal level for his own initial
demand, q i? on the assumption that "the opponent will finally accept this offer by gradually conceding to this
point." He does this by taking into account the trade-offs between improvements in the final settlement terms
associated with higher initial demands, and the increased costs which higher demands produce as they extend
the time required to reach a specific contract. In other words, the bargainer is to choose a demand q, which
maximizes his total present utility value U, (i.e. to Max. U, = f,(q,) * e D,Wl - Z, with respect to q, ). The first and
second order conditions for a maximum are:
[ fXaJ + L, / D, ] * D, / rj = rVCqJ (6)
and ?(4)*(-D0/ij + f'W < 0, or since f,'^) > 0, and r
}
> 0:
f/W / ?(qi) * r, - Di < (7)
After stating his initial demand, q,, each bargainer observes the behavior of the opponent. If the
opponent acts in the expected fashion, the bargainer retains his estimate of the opponent's concession rate and
his initial bargaining plan for the next phase of the interaction. Otherwise, the bargainer adjusts his expectation
about the opponent's concession rate and his demand accordingly. In general, if the opponent concedes more
slowly (or rapidly) than expected, the bargainer makes a concession (or revise his demand upward) and lowers
(or raises) his expectation about the opponent's concession rate. This simple learning process can be described
in following mathematical terms:
dr, / dt > 0, if - dq, / dt > r, ;
dr, / dt = 0, if - dq, / dt = r, ; (8)
dr, / dt < 0, if - dq, / dt < r, ;
Furthermore, the magnitude of dr, / dt varies positively with the discrepancy between -dq,/dt and r, :
the greater the error in bargainer j's expectation, the faster his expectations will change. Thus it will require:
d (dr, / dt) / d [-(dq, / dt) - r, ] > (9)
Due to the learning process, the expected concession rate r
;
is likely to change over time. As a
consequence, bargainer i's outcome demand q, will also be a function of time. Analytically, we can find dq, / dt
simply by differentiating equation (6) with respect to t (and substituting f,'(q,) * r- for (f,(q,) + L, / DJ * D, ) and
solving for dq, / dt, obtaining:
dq, / dt = (drj / dt) / {D, - r/ (f,"(q,) / f,'(q,)]} (10)
Both bargainers engage in a similar sequence of expectations-demand-adjustment-expectations-demand
which leads to two important results:
< 1 > The Convergence of Expectations and Concession Rates: Suppose r 2 , bargainer l's expectation of 2's rate
of concession, is greater than r, . According to equation (9) and (10), larger errors in expectations bring about
faster changes in expectations, and r 2 will fall faster than r,. Finally, the ratio r { / r2 is expected to display
equilibrium properties (i.e., r, / r 2 approaches a constant).
3
<2> The Cross Solution and the Nash Solution: The interaction process generated by the model consists of a
repetition of these cycles until such time as agreement is reached. Agreement is defined by the situation in which
the sum of the bargainers' demands is equal to the available supply, that is, q, + ^ = M. Divide the left and
right hand sides of equation (6), the utility maximization expression for bargainer 1, by the left and right hand
sides of a similar utility maximization expression for bargainer 2, as follows:
f,'(q,) / f^M-q,) = [f.^ + L./D,] / [f2(M-qi ) + L2/D 2 ] * D,/D 2 * r,/r2 (11)
If we follow Nash's example and shift the origins of the utility functions so that a point of permanent
disagreement is represented by the origin, and if we consider the utilities only at the time of agreement, we
obtain the following utility functions:
U, = Uq,) + L, / D,
U 2 = f2(M-q,) + L2 / D 2 (12)
Transforming equation (11) into utility terms as expressed in equation (12), we obtain the Cross solution:
dU, / dU 2 = - U, / U 2 * r, / r 2 * D, / D 2 (13)
where U, , D, , and r, , are bargainer i's utility, discount rate, and the opponent's expectation about bargainer
i's concession rate, respectively. In the special case of similar bargainers - bargainers with equal discount rates
(D
1
= D 2) and equivalent learning abilities - we concluded that we had an equilibrium relationship between
expectations when r
x
= r2 . In this case, the bargaining outcome can be expected to be the Nash solution since
the assumption of similar bargainers satisfies Nash's symmetry axiom.
The Cross solution shown above obviously is more general than the Nash solution and it is reasonable
to expect that the Cross solution might have higher predictive power than the Nash solution in that the Cross
solution directly captures the variances resulting from asymmetries of bargainers' discount rates and concession
rates. However, the Cross model has not been subjected to empirical tests in a marketing context. This is
probably due to following reasons: < 1 > economic models of bargaining have been considered a tool depicting
the bargaining process rather than predicting the ultimate bargaining outcomes; <2> expectations are an
important part of the Cross model and these measures are not directly observable; hence, the Cross model
cannot be measured with ease (Bartos 1974: p296). However, in the Cross model, the expectation is a function
of actual concession behavior (equation (8) and (9)), and the ratio of the two expectations as well as the ratio
of the two concession rates will both converge to a constant. Hence, it is justifiable to use the ratio of the two
actual concession rates to represent the ratio of the two expectations, tJt2 . This conjecture seems to be
supported by Cross's (1977: p45) later paper. 4 Therefore, it becomes possible to test whether or not the Cross
model has the potential to predict the outcomes of buyer-seller bargaining in a marketing context better than
does Nash's theory.
The two types of models discussed above are representative of the economic approach to bargaining.
Several concepts from the social psychology literature provide additional insights into bargaining behavior.
(3) Social-Psychological Factors in Bargaining
A few studies in the marketing literature have found that social-psychological factors are influential in
bargaining. Of them, several important and relevant findings are summarized as follows: asymmetrical power
structure is found to influence bargaining efficiency (Dwyer & Walker 1981; Dwyer 1984), a seller's expected
trustworthiness-plus-toughness in bargaining leads to higher levels of buyer-seller cooperation and agreement
and a higher level of buyer concessions (Schurr & Ozanne 1985), and buyers make higher systematic concessions
when under the buying firm's close monitoring and simultaneously receiving ambiguous information from the
seller (Clopton 1984).
Bargaining problems also have been widely discussed in the social psychology literature. Several
comprehensive literature reviews are provided by Rubin & Brown (1975), Druckman (1977), Magenau & Pruitt
(1979), Pruitt (1981), and recently by Carnevale & Pruitt (1992). This body of literature investigates the effects
of such social-psychological factors as time pressure, power, pressure to reach agreement, the opponent's
concession behavior, constituent surveillance and accountability, and risk taking on bargaining behavior (e.g.
concession behavior, extent of bluffing, information exchange behavior) and outcomes (e.g. joint payoff, individual
payoff, time required to reach an agreement, and number of agreements reached). Previous studies show that
among these dependent variables, concession rate and payoff are most frequently investigated because the
concession not only is the principal activity of the bargaining process but also determines the final payoff, and
achievement of a better payoff is the main objective of the bargaining. Equally important, the Cross model also
shows that concession rate is a crucial factor in determining the final bargaining outcomes. It is the concession
rate that links social-psychological factors and an economic bargaining model, the Cross model; hence, the
concession rate makes an integrated bargaining model possible. Therefore, the rest of this section is devoted to
identifying social-psychological factors which are determinants of concession rate and payoff.
According to the literature, a bargainer's concession rate is found to be larger when the bargainer is
under higher time pressure (Smith et. al. 1982; Pruitt & Johnson 1970; Yukl et. al. 1974a), when the bargainer
has higher pressure to reach agreement (Hamner 1974; Komorita & Barnes 1969), when a mediator is available
to suggest compromised advice (Pruitt & Johnson 1970), when not under constituent's surveillance and
accountability (Carnevale et. al. 1979; Benton & Druckman 1974), when the bargainer has lower relative power
(Herman & Kogan 1968), and when the bargainer has lower propensity in risk taking (Harnett et. al., 1968;
Sherman 1967).
Payoff usually is categorized into two types: joint payoff and individual payoff. Joint payoff is believed
to be higher under cooperative or integrative bargaining than under distributive, or competitive bargaining. 5
Individual payoff is believed to be higher when the bargainer has more influence on the opponent (Pruitt 1981;
Magenau & Pruitt 1979). The empirical studies found a supporting result that joint payoff is higher when the
bargainers are under low time pressure (Yukl et. al. 1976), are not under constituent surveillance and
accountability (Carnevale et. al. 1979), have equal power (Silver 1969), or have moderate limits and expect a
cooperative future relationship (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt 1984). Individual payoff is higher when the bargainer is under
lower pressure to reach agreement (Hamner 1974), when the bargainer's concession rate is low and the opponent
is under high pressure to reach agreement (Hamner 1974), when the bargainer has a moderately high fall-back
position (Bartos 1974), when the bargainer is not under constituent surveillance (Carnevale et. al. 1979), or when
the bargainer has high relative power (Hornstein 1965).
In sum, the studies from the social-psychological approach largely investigate the strengths and
directions of certain social-psychological factors on bargaining behavior and outcomes, especially the concession
behavior and payoff. But this approach can not determine the ultimate bargaining outcomes as does the
economic approach. Therefore, the social- psychological approach alone, like economic approach, is not enough
to describe a complete bargaining theory.
Summary of the Critical Findings in the Relevant Literature
Several critical findings are drawn from the relevant literature discussed above:
(1) The bargaining models that draw from the economic approach are used for predicting the ultimate
outcomes of bargaining, but these models usually do not accommodate social-psychological factors.
(2) The Nash solution is a reasonable predictor of the average outcome of dyadic bargaining in the
marketing context (Neslin and Greenhalgh 1983, 1986; Eliashberg et. al., 1986), yet the prediction is not very
accurate in predicting the individual dyadic outcome (Neslin and Greenhalgh 1986).
(3) The Cross model can yield a solution which is more general than the Nash solution.
(4) Social-psychological factors are influential in determining the process and the change of outcomes of
bargaining, but the social-psychological approach alone can not locate the ultimate outcomes of bargaining.
Comparing the strengths and weaknesses of these two approaches, we conclude that it is important to
integrate them. Fortunately, the Cross model can be connected to several crucial social-psychological factors
discussed in this section through the concession rate and discount rate. Details of these connections will be
discussed in the next section.
AN INTEGRATED MODEL OF BARGAINING
Based on the theoretical foundation discussed above, an integrated model of bargaining incorporating
the Cross economic bargaining model and several crucial social-psychological factors is proposed and illustrated
in Figure 1. The following section provides justification for the integrated model.
This integrated model builds on the theoretical foundations of social psychology by considering those
factors that are direct antecedents to the concession rate and discount rate in the Cross model. As shown in
the previous chapter, the social psychology literature of bargaining suggests that a bargainer's concession rate
is influenced by the following factors: time pressure, pressure to reach agreement, the opponent's concession rate,
presence of a mediator, constituent surveillance and accountability, risk-taking propensity, and relative power.
Among these factors, the pressure to reach agreement is defined as "the cost of not reaching agreement"
(Komorita & Barnes 1969; Hamner 1974); hence, it is a facet of relative power defined by Komorita (1977). To
avoid double counting the effects of these two factors, they are deleted from the list of independent
determinants for the concession rate. The interactions of the opponent's concession rate with the bargainer's
throughout the bargaining is similar to the concession mechanism depicted within the Cross model.
Furthermore, instead of picking the mediator factor, which is relatively unlikely to happen in the buyer-seller
bargaining context, we develop a construct called tough self-image, and hypothesize that a bargainer's tough self-
image would influence his concession behavior. Therefore, the five determinants of concession rate to be
discussed are: relative power, constituent surveillance and accountability, bargainer's personality toughness, time
pressure, and risk-taking propensity.
Perceived relative power (P)
Power can be defined as "the capacity to elicit concessions from the other party" (Magenau & Pruitt
1979), or "the power of A over B is equal to and based upon the dependence of B over A" (Emerson 1962).
Power comes from five basic sources: legitimate, reward, expert, referent, and coercive (French & Raven 1959).
A bargainer with higher power over the opponent tends to have greater strength maintaining his current demand,
and hence use more distributive tactics and concede less. Research evidence (Hornstein 1965; Herman & Kogan
1968; Dwyer & Walker 1981) supports this hypothesis. But, when A feels stronger than B, there is no guarantee
that B will feel weaker than A. Thus, it is the perceived relative power that leads the bargainer to behave in a
strong or weak fashion, and in turn to concede less or more. Therefore, we hypothesize that
HI: A bargainer who perceives himself to be relatively more powerful in the bargaining situation
than the opponent (i.e., the bargainer has higher perceived relative power) will have a lower
concession rate than one perceiving himself as less powerful.
Organizational monitoring (OM)
Research evidence shows that constituent surveillance motivates bargainers to follow their constituents'
advice about how to behave toward the opponent. Where constituents give no advice, bargainers believe that they
risk-taking\
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favor a hard and aggressive approach (Organ 1971; Benton & Druckman 1974; Carnevale, Pruitt, & Briiton
1979). Moreover, when the constituents can reward or punish bargainers on the basis of bargainers' performance,
this acountablility encourages slow concession making (Bartunek, Benton, & Keys 1975; Ben-Yoav & Pruitt
1984). In the organizational buyer-seller bargaining context, the constituents usually are bargainers' supervisors
who have the right to monitor and decide the bargainers' job rewards (i.e., with both surveillance and
accountability). Hence, we use "organizational monitoring" for "constituent surveillance and accountability' and
hypothesize that
H2: When a bargainer is monitored by his organization (usually his supervisor), his concession
rate will be lower than it would be if he were not monitored.
This is probably because a bargainer has stronger motivation to show his supervisor that, during the negotiation,
he has tried very hard to obtain or secure higher profits for the organization.
Bargainer's tough self-image (TSI)
Spector (1977b: p57) argues that "bargainer personality identifies basic predispositions toward the
opponent and motives for future actions and responses. Personality factors are likely to influence the toughness
or softness of positions that are taken." Tough self-image, defined as "an individual's self-image about his/her
attitudinal propensity not to yield," can thus be a critical factor that facilitates the formation of an intention not
to yield, which in turn leads to the behavioral toughness. Tough self-image was discussed by James (1890) in his
famous book, Principles of Psychology , under the label of "toughmindedness", and was further elaborated by
Eysenck (1954, 1961) and Eysenck & Wilson (1976) as "toughminded attitude". Toughminded attitudes are
described as practical rather than idealistic, expedient rather than altruistic, dogmatic rather than flexible, and
active rather than passive. This construct may also be related to several other personality traits discussed by
Rubin & Brown (1975), such as cooperativeness, inflexibility, and machiavellianism. Inspired by Spector's (1977b)
work and by Geis's (1970) finding that a bargainer who is high in machiavellianism tends to defend his demands,
and by Kelly and Stahelski's (1970a) finding that bargainers with a cooperative attitudinal personality tend to
behave more cooperatively than those with opposite attitude, we hypothesize that
H3: A bargainer with a tougher self-image will behave more toughly; hence will have a lower
concession rate than will one who is with softer self-image.
Time pressure (TP)
Time pressure can be defined as "a time cost" (Yukl et. al. 1976), "a perception on the part of both
bargainers that the bargaining is about to be terminated whether or not an agreement is reached" (Pruitt &
Drews 1969; Yukl 1974a), or "closeness to a deadline" (Smith et. al. 1982). Under high time pressure, bargainers
are forced to do quick settlement; hence, time pressure will result in a relatively high concession rate (Smith et.
al. 1982; Yukl 1974a) and in a situation which is relatively unconducive to problem-solving and deliberate search
for integrative solutions, and in turn lower payoff (Yukl et. al. 1976). Therefore, we hypothesize that
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H4: A bargainer with higher time pressure will be willing to concede faster in order to reach the
agreement earlier, to save time cost or be able to reach an agreement before the deadline, than
will one with less time pressure; hence he will have a higher concession rate.
Risk-taking propensity (RTP)
Risk-taking propensity can be defined as "a general willingness to take risks" (Rubin & Brown 1975).
Distributive bargaining strategy is a trade-off between high self payoff if an agreement is achieved and high risk
of no agreement. Therefore, high risk-takers would be more willing to conduct a distributive strategy with a low
concession rate at the expense of a high risk of no agreement. Harnett et. al. (1968), found that under
incomplete information situation, high risk-takers yield less (make fewer concessions) than low risk-takers.
Therefore, we hypothesize that
H5: A bargainer with a higher risk-taking propensity will have a lower concession rate relative to
a more risk-averse bargainer.
Discount rate (D)
Discount rate is the rate bargainers used to discount the value of the utility they receive in the future.
It is the other determinant of final bargaining outcomes in the Cross model and has a strict definition in
economic literature which is
D = (1 + R)/(1-THETA) - 1 (14)
where THETA is the risk of failing to materialize the future reward and R is time cost.
It is clear from above equation that higher D is due to higher THETA or higher R. Because time pressure is
positively correlated with time cost, higher time pressure will lead to higher D. Furthermore, high risk-takers
would tolerate higher risk; hence they would perceive a lower THETA value, in turn leading to lower D.
Therefore, we hypothesize that
H6: A bargainer under higher time pressure will possess a higher discount rate than a less
pressured bargainer.
H7: A bargainer with higher risk-taking propensity will possess a lower discount rate than a more
risk-averse bargainer.
Moreover, to maximize the future utility, a bargainer with a higher discount rate would have incentive
to reach agreement earlier by conceding faster than a bargainer with a lower discount rate. Therefore, we
further hypothesize that
H8: A bargainer with a higher discount rate will concede faster than a bargainer with a lower
discount rate.
AN INTEGRATED MODEL
The mathematical formulation of this integrated bargaining model is as follows:
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D, = «u + y„
* TP, + y2 , * RTP, + e„ (15-i)
C, = ah + b„ * P, + b2l * OM, + b3l * TSI, + b4l * TP, + b5l * RTP,
+ b6l *D, + e 2l (16-i);i = l,2
where e
J(
are random errors and a
)t
are constants.
The parameters bh (corresponding to hypothesis 1, HI), b2l (H2), b3l (H3), b5l (H5), and y2l (H7) are
hypothesized to be negative while b4 , (H4), b6 , (H8), and y,, (H6) are hypothesized to be positive.
Furthermore,
H9: The model predicts the outcome of bargaining to be the solution to the following equation:
- dU, / dU 2 = U, / U 2 * C, / C2 * D, / D 2 (17)
where U, , C, , and D, are bargainer i's utility, concession rate, and discount rate, respectively.
The next section presents the data-collection method, describes the instrument used, and gives the
detailed procedure for obtaining all the measures used in testing the hypotheses.
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
An experiment simulating buyer-seller bargaining over a hypothetical sales agreement was conducted
in a behavioral laboratory with an eight-cell orthogonal main-effect experimental design because three out of the
five social-psychological factors included in the model needed to be manipulated to ensure sufficient variation
of these variables. Perceived relative power was manipulated in three levels (higher, equal, lower), organizational
monitoring in two levels (with, without), and time pressure in two levels (high, low). Utility functions were
predetermined by the profit schedule given to the bargainers. Other variables were measured.
Experimental Design
A complete design for this study would involve crossing buyers' three levels of perceived relative power,
two levels of organizational monitoring, and two levels of time pressure with those of seller ina3x2x2x3x
2x2 between-dyads design. However, in this instance, a balanced 3x2x2x2x2 between-dyads design was
attained by matching buyer-seller's perceived relative power as following: high-low, equal-equal, and low-high.
Furthermore, since the proposed model does not postulate interaction effects between the independent variables
in equations 15-i and 16-i, only main effects were tested. Therefore, an orthogonal main-effect plan of factorial
design was sufficient for this study. According to Addelman (1962: p26-27), an orthogonal main-effects plan for
the 3 x 24 experiment is an eight-cell design. The treatment combinations for the present study are shown in
Table 1.
Table 1
TREATMENT COMBINATIONS
Ps Pb OMs OMB TPS TPB
1 1 1 1
-1 1 1
-1 1 1
-1 1 1 1
-1 1 1 1
-1 1 1
-1 1 1 1
where PB and Ps represent buyer's and seller's perceived relative power, respectively. Level "0" is assigned when
bargainers perceive equal power, level "1" is assigned when bargainers perceive higher power, and level "-1" is
assigned when bargainers perceive lower power than their opponents. OMs and OM B represent
organizational monitoring on the seller and the buyer respectively. Level "0" is assigned when without
organizational monitoring, and level "1" is assigned when under organizational monitoring. TPS and TPB represent
time pressure to the seller and the buyer respectively. Level "0" is assigned when under low time pressure, and
level "1" is assigned when under high time pressure.
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Task Scenario
A role-playing task was employed in which an industrial buyer and seller bargained over a hypothetical
sales agreement involving such issues as price, delivery time, and after-sale service, which are typically important
to industrial buyer-seller bargaining. Buyers and sales representatives bargained, on behalf of their own
companies, on these three purchase-related issues for an industrial good. Each issue was presented along a scale
of possible settlement points, each point associated with a particular utility level for the issue (see Table 2). The
utility schedule was so designed that the issues involved were of differential importance (utility) between
settlement points to the buyers and the sellers. Since the integrated model also focused on how bargainers
divided the surplus, given that the utility possibilities frontier (the set of pareto optimal outcomes) was known
to both parties, the information of both parties' preference was given to both parties.
Subjects
To test the theory, data were collected from 150 (75 dyads) MBA students recruited at a large university
located in western New York. This sample size is greater than the sample size required in the original sampling
plan, which is 128 persons or 64 dyads (8 cells x 8 dyads/cell x 2 persons/dyad). A The subjects in the buyers'
group have a mean working experience of 5.82 years and a medium level of negotiation experience (mean of 4.1
measured on three self-report Likert scales of 1 to 7, with 1 representing very little negotiation experience' and
7 representing 'extensive negotiation experience'). The subjects in the sellers' group have a mean working
experience of 5.86 years and a medium level of negotiation experience (mean of 4.2 measured by the same scales
as those used for the subjects in the buyer group). Above profiles show that the subjects used in this study were
qualified for the required negotiation task.
To increase subjects' motivation to conduct the bargaining task seriously, certain extra credits for the
courses they were taking were given to each subject proportional to their performance in the bargaining. Pretest
data showed that such an incentive system could motivate the subjects effectively because they, as MBA students,
considered grading to be relevant and important to them.
Variables
Perceived relative power was manipulated by the relative degree of dependence similar to the way used
in Dwyer & Walker (1981). In the higher power situation, subjects were told that "you are the sole supplier (or
buyer) and your opponent is only one of your three buyers (or suppliers) for this industrial good. Your opponent
really depends on you in this agreement." In the case of an equal power situation, the statement was "you are
one of a few suppliers (or buyers) of your opponent and your opponent is one of the a few buyers (or suppliers)
of you for this good. You and your opponent are equally dependent on each other in this agreement." For the
lower power case, the statement was a reverse of that for higher power case.
Organizational monitoring was manipulated by telling the bargainer, if under organizational monitoring,
that "your supervisor will be watching the whole bargaining process and will use your performance in this
bargaining to assign an extra credit for you." The bargainer could see his supervisor sitting behind him in the
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same room. During bargaining, for each round of offer the bargainer was asked to pass his offer and the
counteroffer he receives to his supervisor via the experimenter. A bargainer without organizational monitoring
was told that his supervisor would be busy doing something else and hence would not be able to watch the
bargaining process. The bargainer was not told anything about the consequence of his performance in this
bargaining. In addition, the bargainer could see that his supervisor was not with him in the room.
Time pressure was manipulated by cost of time and the approach of a deadline. All the bargainers were
told that they would receive extra credit for the courses they were taking proportional to the utility value level
they achieved in the agreement. A bargainer in high time pressure (HTP) was told that "Due to high costs in
maintaining the bargaining, you have only 10 rounds of offers 7 to reach agreement (each round consists of an
offer from you and a counteroffer from your opponent). In other words, you are allowed to try up to 10 offers
to your opponent. If you have not reached agreement with your opponent in 10 rounds of offers, the 'no
agreement' alternative will be imposed. Moreover, there will be a bargaining cost associated with the failure to
reach agreement. Failure to reach agreement on each trial will result in the deduction of 5% of your extra credit,
which will be proportional to the value level you achieve in the agreement, to compensate part of the bargaining
cost for each trial." To increase the effectiveness of the manipulation, a reminder note indicating the cumulative
loss was given to the bargainer in each round. Bargainers in low time pressure were told that "you have plenty
of time to negotiate for this agreement and there will be no cost for each trial."
There was a set of manipulation-check questions for the above three variables before and after the
subjects actually engaged in bargaining. The pre-bargaining check was to examine the effectiveness of the
manipulation and the post-bargaining check, when compared to the pre-bargaining check, was used to examine
the perceptual change of these three variables that the subjects learned from the actual bargaining process.
Results of these manipulation checks are presented in Table 5.
Tough self-image Although this variable has not been investigated in the social psychology literature
on bargaining, twelve items from Rahim's (1983) "Dominating-Obliging Scale", developed to capture differences
in handling interpersonal conflict, have the face validity to measure "a bargainer's tendencies to be ruthlessly
competitive, seeking mainly self-interest, oriented toward winning, driving a hard bargain," (Rahim, 1983) a
construct conceptually similar to the tough self-image proposed in our model. Therefore, mixed with several filler
items, these twelve items were used to measure tough self-image as shown in Exhibit 1.
Risk-taking propensity. Several measures were developed before 1961 for risk-taking propensity.
Unfortunately, Slovic (1962) found that those measures do not demonstrate convergent validity; hence, he
concluded that none or only a few of these measures actually capture the trait. A few instruments were developed
after 1962. Kogan and Wallach's (1964) instrument was used in studies by Harnett et. al. (1968) and Sherman
(1967) found a significant relationship between risk-taking propensity and bargaining behavior. The Kogan and
Wallach's instrument consists of twelve choice dilemmas, each of which describes a hypothetical situation in
which the subject is asked to indicate the lowest probability of success he would tolerate and still recommend
that the risk action be taken by the central person in the incident. Exhibit 2 illustrates the type of incident
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included. However, Teger and Pruitt ( 1%7) found that only incidents 1, 4, 6, 7, 9, and 11 of Kogan and Wallach's
instrument actually measure risk-taking propensity well. Therefore, this six-incident instrument, shown in Exhibit
2, was used to measure risk-taking propensity.
Utility function. Bargainers were given a utility scoring table shown in Table 2 and to use it to represent
bargainers' utility functions. To minimize the potential error owing to the subjects' inability to find the utility
possibilities frontier, the possible outcomes on the utility possibilities frontier as shown in Tabl 3 were also given
to both parties.
Table 2
BUYER AND SELLER VALUE TABLES
l\'lt\cr\- time Price After-sale senice
l.e\el \ alue point Le\-el Value point Level i aim- point
BUYER
I week 1000 PS 700 A 400
1 month 900 P4 500 B 300
2 months 600 P3 300 C 200
3 months 300 P: 100 D 100
4 months P, -100 E
5 months -300
SELLER
1 week P> -100 A -300
1 month 100 P4 100 B
2 months 200 Pi 300 C 300
3 months 300 P2 500 D 600
4 months 400 P, 700 E 900
5 months 500
* The value of no agreement is equal to point.
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Table 3
THE EFFICIENT OUTCOMES
Alternative Delivery Price After-sale Total value point to the
sen'ice BUYER SELLER
1 one week P5 A 2100 -400
2 one week P5 B 2000 -100
3 one week P5 C 1900 200
4 one week P5 D 1800 500
5 one week P5 E 1700 800
6 one month P5 E 1600 900
7 one week P4 E 1500 1000
8 one month P4 E 1400 1100
9 one week P3 E 1300 1200
10 one month P3 E 1200 1300
11 one week P2 E 1100 1400
12 one month P2 E 1000 1500
13 one week PI E 900 1600
14 one month PI E 800 1700
15 two months PI E 500 1800
16 three months PI E 200 1900
17 four months PI E -100 2000
18 five months PI E -400 2100
Concession rate. Since the ratio of two bargainers' concession rates and the ratio of two bargainers'
expectations about opponents' concession rates were expected to converge to a constant as bargaining went on,
the concession rate was defined and measured as the magnitude of the difference of two consecutive demands
(in terms of the associated utility value points) when the ratio of two bargainers' observable changes of demand
converged to a constant ratio. These data were derived from the two bargainers' actual concession behavior
recorded on their 'Offers and Counteroffers Record'.
Discount rate was measured by the method similar to the one used by Benxion et. al., (1990) in an
experimental study of discount rates. The method used in this study is to ask subjects four scenario questions
such as the following question: "Given the bargaining situation (especially cost of time ) that you are facing,
assume you get an agreement in this period which has 1,000 points of value to you. Suppose you have a chance
to trade in these 1,000 points of value for an agreement in the next period. But there will be some risk that you
will never obtain that agreement in the next period; hence you will have some chance of losing the 1,000 points
when you trade in your current agreement. Assuming that you have to trade in the current agreement, please
estimate and write down the minimum points of value the future agreement must have in order for you to feel
that you do not lose by trading in your current agreement for the future one." This statement includes the two
major elements of the discount rate. First, the time cost a bargainer faced by the manipulation stimulus for time
pressure would lead to a time preference. Second, bargainers with different risk-taking propensities would form
different risk rates, THETAs, when told there is some risk of losing the 1,000 points of value from current
agreement. The discount rate is equal to subtracting one from the ratio between the value points of the future
agreement and that of the current agreement.
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Procedure
Before the experiment was conducted, subjects were requested to answer opinion questionnaires I and
II (shown in Exhibits 1 and 2) to measure the subjects' tough self-image and risk-taking propensity when they
signed up for the experiment without knowing what the experiment would be. The answered questionnaires were
returned to the experimenter about one week before the experiment was actually conducted. Since the subjects
were MBA students in the same school, they might know each other to some extent. To avoid undesirable
personal effects, the members of a pair were arranged to bargain with each other without knowing one another's
identity. On arrival at the experimental site, subjects were randomly assigned to pairs, then two confederates
were introduced as their supervisors. The pair of two bargainers could not see or talk to each other but both
could see the experimenter and their own supervisors if they were under organizational monitoring condition.
Subjects were given a booklet containing (1) preliminary instructions providing an overview of the bargaining task
and their role in the bargaining, (2) the bargaining scenario describing the buying firm and the purchase to be
bargained, the seller and selling firm, the specific issues to be bargained, and information about the possible
outcomes (different combinations of price level, delivery lead time, and after-service level of the hypothetical
merchandise), and (3) procedural instructions explaining the utility scoring table and how to make offers and
receive offers through the experimenter.
After subjects had read through the booklet, a pre-bargaining questionnaire was administered to test
how well subjects understood their own and their opponents' preferences on each issue to be bargained.
Thereafter, subjects read randomly assigned manipulation statements and answered pre-bargaining manipulation-
check questions. Then, subjects began to bargain with their opponents by writing their demands on the 'Offers
and Counteroffers Record' sheet and passed it to their opponents through the experimenter until an agreement
or a predetermined number of trials was reached. Finally, subjects answered a set of post-bargaining
manipulation checks and a post-bargaining questionnaire then receive a debriefing session before leaving.
Analysis Plan
After data were collected for the variables discussed above, the analysis proceeded as follows. First, the
parameters in equations 15-1, 15-2, 16-1, and 16-2 were estimated by two OLS (ordinary least squared) regression
analyses for equations 15-1 and 15-2 and a 3SLS (three-stage least squared) regression analysis for equation 16-1
and 16-2, based on the data collected from the experiment. The justification for doing so is that < 1> equations
15-i and 16-i form a recursive model because discount rate (D,) is formed prior to and contributes to the
formation of concession rate (C,); hence, equations 15-i and 16-i can be estimated separatedly. However, <2>
the two bargainers' concession behaviors were interacting with each other during the bargaining; therefore, the
error terms in equations 16-1 and 16-2 should be correlated and a 3SLS is required to estimate theses two
equations simultaneously.
These equations were then tested by the F statistics and hypotheses 1 through 8 were tested by T
statistics. In order to conduct the above regression analyses, the three manipulated variables in equations 15-i
and 16-i became independent variables in the regression models by assigning a categorical variable to represent
1<)
the three levels of perceived relative power, and each a dummy variable for organizational monitoring and time
pressure, respectively, to represent the two levels of each of these two variables.
Second, the predictive power of the integrated model was tested in three steps. Step 1 was to derive
predicted outcomes of the integrated model by solving equation 17. Then, in step 2, each pair of bargainers'
actual outcome was compared to its corresponding predicted outcome to see how close they were with each
other. Percentage deviation was calculated to show how much actual outcome deviated from predicted outcome.
Moreover, a pair-t-test was conducted to test the correlation coefficient and the significance of the mean
difference between actual and predicted outcomes. Finally, in step 3, actual outcomes were regressed on
predicted outcomes across all bargaining pairs. Although ideally one could argue for intercept to be and slope
to be 1, the predictive power of the integrated model was considered to be the closeness between actual and
predicted outcomes or the closeness between actual slope and the ideal slope, 1.
It took some effort to obtain the predicted outcomes of the integrated model by solving equation 17.
Theoretically, the solution described in equation 17 must be solved by the differential equation method after the
two bargainers' utility functions and the ratios of the two concession rates and of the two discount rates are
obtained. However, the two bargainers' utility possibilities frontier in this study is a composition of three linear
line segments. 8 This special case allowed us to compute the predicted outcomes algebraically. Detail of the
calculation can be obtained from the author.
20
RESULTS
This section presents the empirical findings of the study, techniques employed for testing the hypotheses,
and the discussion of the results.
Data
A total of 75 pairs of data were collected from 150 MBA students. Among them, 64 pairs reached
agreement while 1 1 pairs did not. The results of a quiz designed to test the subjects' understanding about the
negotiation task showed that the subjects had good understanding about the task and the information provided
to them. Due to the scrutiny of the experimenter, all the subjects but two answered all the questions and those
two subjects did answered all the questions required for the analysis in this study. 9 Hence, all 75 pairs of data
were used to test equations 15-i and 16-i since these equations are independent of final agreement. However,
when testing equation 17, the predictive power of the integrated model, only those 64 pairs of data with
agreement were used since the 11 no-agreement pairs had no actual agreement to be tested against their
corresponding predicted outcomes derived from equation 17.
Measures
Table 4 summarizes the major values of four important variables. Each of these is discussed in the
following.
Tough self-image measured by the 16-item instrument (shown in Exhibit 1), is satisfactorily reliable with
Cronbach a values of 0.83 and 0.80 for buyers' and sellers' groups, respectively. Values of tough self-image in
this study range from 1.53 to 6.38 on the scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing 'very soft' and 7 representing 'very
tough'.
Risk-taking propensity measured by the 6-item instrument (shown in Exhibit 2), is marginally reliable
with Cronbach a values of 0.69 and 0.51 for buyers' and sellers' groups, respectively. Values of risk-taking
propensity in this study range from 1.83 to 5.5 on the scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing 'very low risk taking
propensity' and 7 representing very high risk taking propensity'.
Discount rate measured by the 4-item instrument, is satisfactorily reliable with Cronbach a values of
0.85 and 0.74 for buyers' and sellers' groups, respectively. Values of discount rate in this study range from 0.1
to 4 with mean value of 0.63 and standard deviation of 0.54.
Concession rate ranged from 11 to 650, mean value of 161 and standard deviation of 111 in the buyers'
group, and the values ranged from 33 to 450, mean value of 145 and standard deviation of 85 in the sellers'
group.
Manipulation Check
The effectiveness of the three manipulations employed in this study were checked by the following
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questions:
1
)
The power you have to force your opponent to accept your demands is12 3 4 5
much lower than somewhat lower than equal to somewhat higher than much higher than
that of my opponent.
2) Do you feel that you are monitored by your vice president? If yes, how closely or tightly do you feel you are
monitored? 12 3 4 5
No very loosely somewhat loosely moderately somewhat closely very closely
3) Do you perceive any time pressure in bargaining for this contract? If yes, how heavy is the time pressure?12 3 4 5
No very light somewhat light moderate somewhat heavy very heavy
The manipulation check values presented in Table 5 show that all three manipulations were effective
and consistent before and after bargaining.
Hypothese Testing
Hypotheses 1 through 5 and hypothesis 8 were tested using the regression results of equations 16-1 and
16-2 presented in Table 6 while hypotheses 6 and 7 were tested using the regression results of equations 15-1
and 15-2 presented in Table 7. Finally, hypothesis 9 was tested using equation 17. The testing results between
actual and predicted outcomes derived from equation 17 are presented in Table 8 through 12. Based on these,
the testing result of each of the nine hypotheses is described as follows.
Hypothesis 1 was supported by the data since the coefficients of perceived relative power in the buyers'
and sellers' groups were statistically significant at a level of 0.1 and 0.05, respectively. The negative coefficient
indicates that a bargainer with higher perceived relative power tends to have a lower concession rate, which is
as hypothesized.
Hypothesis 2 was not supported by the data since the coefficients of organizational monitoring in the
buyers' and sellers' groups were both not significant although in right direction. This result implied that, in this
study, we could not detect an influence on bargainers' concession behavior by the monitoring of their vice
presidents during the bargaining. However, the coefficients were in right direction; hence we may claim it is only
directionallv supported .
Hypothesis 3 was partially supported by the data. The coefficient of bargainer's tough self-image in the
buyers' group was statistically significant at a level of 0.1 while that in the sellers' group, although in hypothesized
direction, was not significant. The negative coefficient indicates that a bargainer with tougher self-image would
behave tougher; hence would have a lower concession rate. These results confirmed hypothesis 3 in the buyers'
group, yet only directionally confirmed in the sellers' group.
Hypothesis 4 was supported by the data. The coefficients of time pressure in the buyers' and sellers'
group were statistically significant at a level of 0.05 and 0.1, respectively. The positive coefficient, coincided with
the hypothesized direction, indicates that a bargainer with higher time pressure would have a higher concession
rate.
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Table 4
MEASUREMENT RESULTS FOR IMPORTANT VARIABLES
Variables Items Cronbach
a Value
Minimum Maximum Mean Standard
Deviation
TSIB 16 0.83 1.53 6.38 3.78 0.79
TSIS 16 0.80 2.25 6.00 3.69 0.69
RTPB 6 0.69 1.83 5.50 3.69 0.82
RTPS 6 0.51* 2.67 5.83 3.94 0.69
DB 4 0.85 0.10 4.00 0.63 0.54
DS 4 0.74 0.10 4.00 0.67 0.67
CB 11.0 650 161.5 111.1
CS 33.3 450 145.1 85.2
Wlxere
TSIB: Buyers' tough self-image
TSIS: Sellers ' tough self-image
RTPB: Buyers ' risk-taking propensity
R TPS: Sellers ' risk-taking propensity
DB: Buyers' discount rate
DS: Sellers' discount rate
CB: Buyers' concession rate
CS: Sellers ' concession rate
*: TJiis value is considerably lower than 0.7, the generally acceptable level.
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Table 5
MANIPULATION CHECK RESULTS
Pre-bargaining Check Post-bargaining Check
Variables Group Scale Mean Std F Sig.
Code Dev
Mean Std F Sig.
Dev
PB
PS
OMB
OMS
TPB
TPS
-1
1
-1
1
1
1
1-5
1 -5
0-5
0-5
0-5
0-5
1.83 0.79
2.72 0.57
4.18 0.68
1.89 0.89
3.56 0.78
4.30 0.92
2.28 1.52
3.41 1.48
2.17 1.87
3.66 1.05
2.49 1.61
3.55 1.01
2.00 1.53
3.39 1.28
79
55
11
18
12
18
.000
.000
.002
.000
.001
.000
1.83
2.78
4.00
1.85
3.22
4.07
1.86
2.80
1.58
2.84
1.86
3.00
1.42
3.08
0.65
0.55
0.68
0.82
0.73
0.78
1.46
1.52
1.78
1.31
1.55
1.36
1.48
1.53
82
57
12
11
22
.000
.000
.009
.001
.001
.000
Where PB: Buyers' perceived relative power
PS: Sellers' perceived relative power
OMB: Buyers' organizational monitoring
OMS: Sellers' organizational monitoring
TPB: Buyers' perceived time pressure
TPS: Sellers' perceived time pressure
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Table 6
3SLS ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR EQUATIONS 16-1 AND 16-2
Dependent Variable: CB
Predictors B SE B T Sig. T
PB -26.807 14. 194 -1.889 .064 +
OMB -25.522 18.422 -1.385 .171
TSIB -16.393 10.091 -1.624 .100 +
TPB 40.308 19.385 2.079 .041 *
RTPB -24.763 12.686 -1.952 .055 +
DB -17.554 17.264 -1.017 .313
(CONSTANT) 302. 199 67.073 4.506 .000 **
Overall Regression Results:
R Square: 0.243, F = 4.74, Sig. F = .0005 **
Dependent Variable: CS
Predictors B SE B T Sig. T
PS -28.695 12.212 -2.407 .019 *
OMS -12.976 15.009 -0.858 .394
TSIS - 5.414 10.873 -0.498 .620
TPS 29.103 12.016 1.817 .074 +
RTPS 11.150 9.101 1.225 .225
DS 5.992 11.103 0.540 .591
(CONSTANT) 127.459 60.689 2.100 .039 *
Overall Regression Results:
R Square: 0.207, F = 2.74, Sig. F = .0197
+ : a < 0.1; *: a < 0.05; a < 0.01
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Table 7
OLS REGRESSION RESULTS FOR EQUATION 15-1 AND 15-2
Dependent Variable: DB
Predictors B SE B Beta T Sig.T
TPB -0.311 0.123 -0.289 -2.525 .014 *
RTPB -0.014 0.089 -0.018 -0.157 .876
(CONSTANT) 0.843 0.364 2.318 .023*
Overall Regression Results:
R Square : 0.084
F Value : 3.19
Sig.F : 0.047
Dependent Variable: DS
Predictors B SE B Beta T Sig. T
TPS 0.061 0.286 0.027 0.214 .831
RTPS -0.129 0.179 -0.089 -0.723 .472
(CONSTANT) 1.717 0.683 2.514 .014 *
Overall Regression Results.
R Square : 0.008
F value : 0.271
Sig.F : 0.764
*: a < 0.05; **: a < 0.01
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Hypothesis 5 was partially supported by the data since only the coefficient of risk-taking propensity in
the buyers' group was statistically significant at a level of 0.05 while that in the sellers' group was not significant.
The negative coefficient in the buyers' group coincides with the hypothesized direction and can be interpreted
as suggesting that a buyer with a higher risk-taking propensity would have a lower concession rate relative to a
more risk-averse buyer in the bargaining.
Hypothesis 6 was not supported by the data. Although the coefficient of time pressure on the discount
rate in the buyers' group was statistically significant at a level of 0.05, the coefficient sign (negative) was opposite
to the hypothesized direction. Moreover, the coefficient in the sellers' group was not significant although in
predicted direction. Those results suggest that, in this study, buyers under higher time pressure possessed lower
discount rates while sellers' discount rates were not influenced by the time pressure they were facing.
Hypothesis 7 was not supported by the data since the coefficient of risk-taking propensity on the discount
rate was not significant in either the buyers' or the sellers' group, although both were in the right direction. This
result shows that, in this study, we could not detect an influence of bargainers' risk-taking propensity on then-
discount rates.
Hypothesis 8 was not supported by the data. The coefficient of discount rate on concession rate was not
significant in either the buyers' group or the sellers' group. This result implies that, in this study, we could not
detect an influence of bargainers' discount rates on their concession rates.
Finally, hypothesis 9, the predictive power of the integrated model, was tested in two aspects: (1) its
absolute predictive power, and (2) its relative predictive power compared to that of the Nash solution. Each of
these is described as follows.
(1) To test the absolute predictive power of the integrated model, the predicted outcomes derived from
equation 17 are presented in Table 8. The comparison of actual and predicted outcomes presented in Table 8
demonstrates that each pair of bargainers' actual outcomes was very close to its associated predicted outcomes.
For the buyers' group, 84.3% of buyers' actual outcomes deviated less than 10% from associated predicted
outcomes; for the sellers' group, 86% of actual outcomes deviated less than 10% from associated predicted
outcomes.
Above results showing the closeness between actual and predicted outcomes were confirmed by the T-
test comparison between actual and predicted outcomes presented in Table 9. The correlation coefficients
between actual and predicted outcomes were very high (0.914 and 0.961 for buyers' and sellers' groups,
respectively) and their mean differences were not significant (with 2-tail probability of 0.156 and 0.676 for buyers'
and sellers' groups, respectively). Therefore, we conclude that actual and their associated predicted outcomes
were statistically close to each other.
Then actual outcomes were regressed on predicted outcomes. Results presented in Table 10 and 1 1 show
that both the constant term and the slope were significantly different from at a level of 0.000. This result was
true for both the buyers' and sellers' groups. Although the hypothesized slope, 1, did not lie within 95%
confident intervals of the regressed slopes (0.785 to 0.981 and 0.789 to 0.917 for the buyers' and sellers' groups,
respectively), the magnitudes of these two slopes (0.883 and 0.85) and their associated R-square values (0.83 and
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Table 8
ACTUAL VERSUS PREDICTED OUTCOMES AND THE PERCENTAGE DEVIATION
BASED ON THE INTEGRATED MODEL AND THE NASH SOLUTION
ID UBF UBH1 IDEVB NDEVB USF USH1 IDEVS NDEVS
103 1200 1176.47 -.02 .04 1300 1323.53 .02 -.04
104 1300 1323.53 .02 -.04 1200 1176.47 -.02 .04
107 1300 1323.53 .02 -.04 1200 1176.47 -.02 .04
108 1200 1176.47 -.02 .04 1300 1323.53 .02 -.04
109 1100 1029.41 -.06 .14 1400 1470.59 .05 -.11
110 1100 1029.41 -.06 .14 1400 1470.59 .05 -.11
203 1200 1176.47 -.02 .04 1300 1323.53 .02 -.04
204 1200 1176.47 -.02 .04 1300 1323.53 .02 -.04
206 1200 1176.47 -.02 .04 1300 1323.53 .02 -.04
207 1300 1447.37 .11 -.04 1000 1052.63 .05 .25
208 1300 1323.53 .02 -.04 1200 1176.47 -.02 .04
209 1200 1176.47 -.02 .04 1300 1323.53 .02 -.04
210 1300 1323.53 .02 -.04 1200 1176.47 -.02 .04
211 1200 1176.47 -.02 .04 1300 1323.53 .02 -.04
212 1300 1323.53 .02 -.04 1200 1176.47 -.02 .04
304 1300 1323.53 .02 -.04 1200 1176.47 -.02 .04
305 1200 1176.47 -.02 .04 1300 1323.53 .02 -.04
307 1500 1617.65 .08 -.17 1000 882.35 -.12 .25
309 1300 1323.53 .02 -.04 1200 1176.47 -.02 .04
310 1500 1617.65 .08 -.17 1000 882.35 -.12 .25
311 1500 1617.65 .08 -.17 1000 882.35 -.12 .25
403 1300 1323.53 .02 -.04 1200 1176.47 -.02 .04
404 1700 1663.66 -.02 -.26 800 909.03 .14 .56
405 1300 1323.53 .02 -.04 1200 1176.47 -.02 .04
406 1300 1323.53 .02 -.04 1200 1176.47 -.02 .04
407 1300 1289.81 -.01 -.04 1200 1210.19 .01 .04
408 1500 1617.65 .08 -.17 1000 882.35 -.12 .25
409 1300 1323.53 .02 -.04 1200 1176.47 -.02 .04
411 1500 1617.65 .08 -.17 1000 882.35 -.12 .25
504 700 1133.81 .62 .79 1600 1588.73 -.01 -.22
505 800 830.86 .04 .56 1700 1689.71 -.01 -.26
506 1200 1176.47 -.02 .04 1300 1323.53 .02 -.04
507 1200 1176.47 -.02 .04 1300 1323.53 .02 -.04
508 1000 882.35 -.12 .25 1500 1617.65 .08 -.17
509 1100 1029.41 -.06 .14 1400 1470.59 .05 -.11
510 1100 1029.41 -.06 .14 1400 1470.59 .05 -.11
511 1200 1176.47 -.02 .04 1300 1323.53 .02 -.04
512 1000 882.35 -.12 .25 1500 1617.65 .08 -.17
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(Table 8 Continued )
ACTUAL VERSUS PREDICTED OUTCOMES AND THE PERCENTAGE DEVIATION
BASED ON THE INTEGRATED MODEL AND THE NASH SOLUTION
ID UBF UBHl IDEVB NDEVB USF USH1
603 1100 1029.41
604 1200 1176.47
605 1100 1029.41
606 1200 1176.47
607 1100 1029.41
609 1300 1323.53
610 1100 1166.67
611 1200 1176.47
612 1200 1176.47
703 1400 1219.51
70S 1400 1578.95
706 1500 1617.65
707 1300 1323.53
708 1500 1617.65
711 1200 1176.47
712 1400 1470.59
803 1100 1029.41
804 1200 1176.47
805 800 860.46
806 1100 1141.30
807 800 1003.43
808 1200 1176.47
809 500 654.67
810 1200 1176.47
811 1000 882.35
812 500 654.67
Where: ID:
UBF:
UBHl:
IDEVB.
NDEVB:
06 .14 1400 1470.59
02 .04 1300 1323.53
06 .14 1400 1470.59
02 .04 1300 1323.53
06 .14 1400 1470.59
02 -.04 1200 1176.47
06 .14 1400 1333.33
02 .04 1300 1323.53
02 .04 1300 1323.53
13 -.11 1100 1280.49
13 -.11 900 921.05
08 -.17 1000 882.35
02 -.04 1200 1176.47
08 -.17 1000 882.35
02 .04 1300 1323.53
05 -.11 1100 1029.41
06 .14 1400 1470.59
02 .04 1300 1323.53
08 .56 1700 1679.85
04 .14 1400 1358.70
25 .56 1700 1632.19
02 .04 1300 1323.53
31 1.50 1800 1748.44
02 .04 1300 1323.53
12 .25 1500 1617.65
31 1.50 1800 1748.44
IDEVS NDEVS
.05 -.11
.02 -.04
.05 -.11
.02 -.04
.05 -.11
-.02 .04
-.05 -.11
.02 -.04
.02 -.04
.16 .14
.02 .39
-.12 .25
-.02 .04
-.12 .25
.02 -.04
-.06 .14
.05 -.11
.02 -.04
-.01 -.26
-.03 -.11
-.04 -.26
.02 -.04
-.03 -.31
.02 -.04
.08 -.17
-.03 -.31
Bargaining pairs' identification number
Buyers ' actual final outcomes
Buyers' predicted outcomes based on the integrated model
Deviation of actual outcomesfrom the predicted outcomes based on the integrated model
in buyers' group = (UBHl - UBF)/UBF
Deviation of actual outcomes from the predicted outcomes based on the Nash solution
in buyers' group = (UBN UBF)/UBF
USF, USH1, IDEVS, & NDEVS similar to the above except they are for the sellers' group
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Table 9
T-TEST RESULTS FOR THE COMPARISON BETWEEN ACTUAL AND
THE PREDICTED OUTCOMES BASED ON THE INTEGRATED MODEL
Variable Number
of Cases
Mean Std.
Dev.
Difference
of Means
t Value 2-tail
Prob.
UBF
UBH1
64
1200.00
1216.88
221.11
230.34
16.88 1.43 .156
USF
USH1
64
1284.38
1287.77
204.10
228.58
3.40 -0.42 .676
Where
UBF: Buyers' actual final outcomes
UBH1: Buyers' predicted final outcomes
USF: Sellers' actual final outcomes
USH1: Sellers ' predicted final outcomes
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Table 10
OLS REGRESSION RESULTS FOR ACTUAL OUTCOMES ON
PREDICTED OUTCOMES IN BUYERS' GROUP
Dependent Variable: DBF (Buyers' actual final outcomes)
Independent Variable B SE B Beta
0.914279UBH1 (Predicted outcomes) 0.88331
(Constant) 126. 1272
0.049692
61.4711
17.772
2.052
Sig. T
0.0000
0.0444
Multiple R: 0.91428
R Square: 0.83591
Adjusted R Square: 0.83326
F: 315.831
Sig. F: 0.0000
Table 11
OLS REGRESSION RESULTS FOR ACTUAL OUTCOMES ON
PREDICTED OUTCOMES IN SELLERS' GROUP
Dependent Variable: USF (Sellers' actual final outcomes)
Independent Variable B SE B Beta
0.95880USH1 (Predicted outcomes) 0.85348 0.031826
(Constant) 186.2705 41.57346
Multiple R: 0.95888
R Square: 0.91945
Adjusted R Square: 0.91817
F: 719.137
Sig. F: 0.0000
26.817
4.481
Sig.T
0.0000
0.0000
M
0.92), along with the closeness results described in previous steps, indicate that the integrated model did
demonstrate very good absolute predictive power in this study.
(2) To compare the relative predictive power between the integrated model and the Nash solution, the
predicted outcomes based on the Nash solution must be derived first. It is straightforward to show that the
predicted outcomes based on the Nash solution were U, = 1250 with U2 = 1250 across all bargaining pairs in
this study. The comparison of actual and predicted outcomes based on the Nash solution showed that only
53.1% and 51.6% of the buyers' and sellers' actual outcomes, respectively, deviated less than 10% from the Nash
solution (This was drawn from the data presented in Table 8). The ranges of deviation were between -25% and
150% and between -31% and 56% in the buyers' and sellers' groups, respectively. To compare relative predictive
power between the integrated model and the Nash solution, a pair-t-test was conducted between the deviation
based on the integrated model (IDEV) and the deviation based on the Nash solution (NDEV). Because the
deviations felt both in the positive and in the negative directions while a meaningful comparison should be based
on the magnitude of the deviations. Therefore, the deviations were transformed to their absolute values
(ABSIDEV and ABSNDEV), then a pair-t-test was conducted and the results are presented in Table 12. The
results show that the mean values of the absolute deviation were 6.63% versus 16.73% and 4.23% versus 12.08%
for integrated model compared to the Nash solution in the buyers' and sellers' groups, respectively. These results
show that the deviations based on the integrated model were significantly lower than those based on the Nash
solution. Based on above results, it is justifiable to conclude that the integrated model had a higher predictive
power than that of the Nash solution in this study.
In sum, hypothesis 9 was supported by the data and the integrated model was proved to fit the data
better than the Nash solution in this study.
So far the hypotheses were tested and results were described. Some further insights about these results
are presented in the next section.
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Table 12
T-TEST RESULTS FOR THE COMPARISON BETWEEN DEGREES OF DEVIATION
BASED ON THE INTEGRATED MODEL AND ON THE NASH SOLUTION
Variable Number
of Cases
Mean Std.
Dev.
Difference
of Means
t Value 2-tail
Prob.
ABSIDEVB
ABSNDEVB
64
0.0653
0.1673
0.094
0.282
-0. 1020 -3.71 .000
ABS1DEVS
ABSNDEVS
64
0.0423
0. 1208
0.038
0.110
-0.0785 -6.77 .000
Wfiere
ABSIDEVB: Absolute value of the deviation between actual and predicted outcomes based on the
integrated model in the buyers' group
ABSNDEVB: Absolute value of the deviation between actual and predicted outcomes based on the
Nash solution in the buyers ' group
ABSIDEVS: Absolute value of the deviation between actual and predicted outcomes based on the
integrated model in the sellers ' group
ABSNDEVS: Absolute value of the deviation between actual and predicted outcomes based on the
Nash solution in the sellers' group
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DISCUSSION
The fact that hypotheses 1 and 4 were supported by the data in this study confirms the conclusions
drawn from previous studies in social-psychological approach to bargaining that bargainers tend to concede more
when they perceive that they are in a less powerful position relative to their opponents or when they are under
time pressure. These findings also increase the generlizability of the theory since the theory was confirmed in
an industrial marketing bargaining context in this study. Similarly, the partially supported hypothesis 5 confirms
and enhances the generalizability of the theory that a bargainer (at least when the bargainer is a buyer) with a
higher risk-taking propensity tends to concede less.
The supportive result of hypothesis 3 in buyers' group adds a new dimension to bargaining theory that
a buyer who is with tougher self-image will behave more toughly; and hence tends to concede less. This result
along with that of hypothesis 5 could bring useful implications to purchasing managers. For example, purchasing
managers should consider such personality factors as tough self-image and risk-taking propensity when recruiting
new buyers, or when assigning bargaining roles to their employees because the employees' future performance
in negotiation will be influenced by such personal characteristics. 13
The fact that while both tough self-image and risk-taking propensity influenced buyers' concession rate
yet had no effect on sellers' concession rate, may lead to a conjecture that these two personality effects were
surpressed by the role effect of sellers. Traditional salesmanship emphasizes that salesmen behave cautiously,
pleasantly and not to be influenced by the salesmen's mood or undesirable personality when dealing with
customers. Testing this conjecture can be an interesting future study.
The insignificant result related to hypothesis 2 led to further tests of the effect size and statistical power
of the three manipulations and the research design in this study. Using Borenstein and Cohen's (1988) computer
program, the effect sizes and statistical powers of perceived relative power, organizational monitoring, and time
pressure were calculated and presented in Table 13. The results show that both perceived relative power and
time pressure had medium to large effect sizes and reasonably high statistical power under the research design.
Yet, the effect size of organizational monitoring was small and its statistical power was weak under the research
design.
Therefore, it could be safer suggesting that the insignificant result of hypothesis 2 might be altered by
increasing the sample size or improving its manipulation than concluding that bargainers' concession rates were
not influenced by organizational monitoring at all. Another possible explanation is that the theory might have
not been working in the context of this study. The simultaneous presence of these five social-psychological factors
in the experiment might have suppressed the effect of organizational monitoring. For example, under high time
pressure, bargainers might have perceived that the purpose of their vice president's presence was to push them
to obtain agreement faster, hence suppressing the organizational monitoring effect. However, constrained by
the data collected under the main-effect plan, we were unable to test such an interaction effect in this study. Yet,
this can be a topic for a follow-up study.
A recent report by Bernstein in Business Week (April 29, 1991, P56) about effect of organizational
monitoring on workers' motivation and productivity is worth mentioning. A survey of several major companies
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in the service industries such as Federal Express, Bell Canada, USAA, and Northwest Airlines, showed that
under supervisor's monitoring, workers were motivated to increase their speed, while quality deteriorated. Some
experiments were conducted by relaxing the supervisor's monitoring and the results were encouraging. Quality
improved while productivity (e.g., speed) stayed up. Hence, led to the following conclusion: "How to motivate
workers: Don't watch them."
The insignificant results of hypotheses 6, 7, and 8 were all associated with discount rate. Although the
measurement used for discount rate was directly derived from its economic definition and proved to be reliable
by the data in this study as well as in Benzion et. al.,'s (1990) experimental economic study, a substantial portion
of the subjects in this study expressed difficulty in answering the discount rate questions during the experiment.
Hence, it is suspected that the insignificant results of hypotheses 6, 7, and 8 could have been due to the
measurement problem of discount rate. Should this be the reason, a more appropriate instrument needs to be
devised for a more conclusive testing result.
Finally, the supportive result of hypothesis 9 demonstrated that the explanatory power of the integrated
model was good and proved to be better than that of the Nash solution in this study. However, 33 out of 64
pairs of outcomes were at (1300, 1200) or (1200, 1300). This result might be a manifestation of the 'fairness
effect', which leads to the results that with complete information bargainers tend to reach outcomes with equal
payoff (Siegel & Fouraker, 1960).
In sum, despite the poor results associated with discount rate, four out of the five crucial social-
psychological factors did influence bargainers' concession rate in the way hypothesized in this study. Furthermore,
the explanatory power of the integrated model was proved to be high and the integrated model predicted better
than the Nash solution. Hence, we can conclude that the proposed model was generally supported by the data
in this study.
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Table 13
EFFECT SIZE AND STATISTICAL POWER CHECK
FOR THE THREE MANIPULATED VARIABLES
Total N = 75 Number of Cells = 12 Mean N Per Cell = 6 ALPHA = 0.10
Dependent Variable = CB
Factor Number of N Per Degrees of Effect Power
Levels Level Freedom Size =/
A = PB 3 25 2 0.294 0.675
B = OMB 2 37.5 1 0.155 0.360
C = TPB 2 37.5 1 0.450 0.976
A * B
A * C
B * C
A * B * C
Dependent Variable = CS
Factor Number of N Per Degrees of Effect Power
Levels Level Freedom Size =f
A = PS 3 25 2 0.210 0.436
B = OMS 2 37.5 1 0.056 0.136
C = TPS 2 37.5 1 0.510 0.993
A *B
A * C
B * C
A * B * C
Computer Program Source:
Borenstein, Michael & Jacob Cohen (1988), Statistical Power Analysis: A Computer Program, Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Hillsdale, NJ.
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CONCLUSIONS
Based on the results of the hypotheses testing, the following conclusions were made. Four out of the
five important social-psychological factors did influence bargainers' concession rate in the way hypothesized in
this study. More specifically, bargainers tended to concede less when they perceive to be in a higher power
position or under lower time pressure. Furthermore, bargainers representing buyers also tended to concede less
when they were with tougher self-image, had higher risk-taking propensity. The insignificant results of
organizational monitoring and discount rate might have been due to the possible confounding effect when those
five social-psychological factors were presence simultaneously as in the context of this study, or due to
measurement problems of these two variables. The integrated model proved to have high predictive power and
to fit the data better than the Nash solution. Managers may use this integrated model to predict possible
bargaining outcomes in their future bargaining task.
Several contributions were made by the present study. First, the proposed integrated model fills a
critical gap in bargaining theory. Second, unlike previous studies in which only one or two factors were tested
at a time, all five social-psychological factors were tested in the present study. Therefore, the significant effects
of four social-psychological factors on bargainers' concession behavior are especially encouraging. Third, the
empirical testing of the integrated model not only provides an example of testing the Cross model and proving
the feasibility of integrating bargaining theory based on economic and social-psychological approaches, but also
provides several managerial implications as follows: (1) The model can better predict future bargaining
outcomes between a pair of bargainers. Hence, managers can use this integrated model to estimate possible
future bargaining outcomes, and set up more efficient targets for their organizations when implementing the
"Management by Objectives" project. (2) The empirical testing results are particularly useful. Marketing and
purchasing managers can draw fruitful managerial implications from the findings about the influences of each
of the five social-psychological factors. Through the control of these variables, the managers will be able to
increase the company's profits or to achieve other relevant objectives. For example, since it is the perception that
matters, marketing and purchasing managers should implement effective communication strategies to influence
their bargaining counterpart to perceive a lower power position or higher time pressure and their own bargainers
to perceive a higher power position and lower time pressure, so that the bargaining outcomes will be more
favorable toward their own organizations. However, such a strategy may only be valid for a one-time negotiation,
in a cooperative setting, and when both parties are not in a competitive situation. The identification of effective
communication or influence strategies is an important and interesting research issue which warrants for further
exploration. Since two personality factors were proved to influence bargaining behavior and outcomes as
hypothesized, as another managerial application of the empirical findings, marketing and purchasing managers
should use those personality factors as part of the selection criteria when recruiting new salesmen and purchasing
agents or when assigning bargaining tasks to specific individuals, because the employees' future performance in
negotiation will be influenced by such personality factors. (3) The proposed model will also be useful in
predicting the outcomes of bargaining in an international marketing context because people from different
countries or cultural backgrounds often use different rates of concession, hold divergent perceptions of the
37
power asymmetry and vary widely in their bargaining skills (Graham 1985; Graham, Kim, Lin, & Robinson
1988). Once the parameters are estimated, the outcomes predicted by the model could be a valuable reference
for future bargaining between bargainers from the same pairs of countries (such as when the bargaining pairs
consist of Japanese-American dyads).
There are several limitations to be aware of when applying this integrated model. First, like the Nash
bargaining theory and the Cross bargaining model, the proposed integrated model is suitable for describing and
predicting two-person, full information, cooperative bargaining problems only. The model concentrates on the
question of division and accepts the assumption of full information that both parties' utility levels of all the
possible outcomes are known to both parties. Although an assumption of full information doesn't sound
descriptive of most real-world bargaining cases, it may result from information exchange between the two parties.
Hence, what might have been extended to the integrated model is the information-exchange process prior to the
bargaining to divide the surplus. Second, external validity of this study could be weak since the subjects were
MBA students. Although Calder et. al., (1981, 1982, 1983) argued that using convenience samples, such as
students, is sufficient for theory testing, Lynch (1982, 1983) argued that one should use a "selective approach"
to extend the generlizability of the theory being tested. Before this model can be applied to an industry, we need
to replicate the testing by collecting data from professional buyers and sales representatives from that industry.
Such an applied extension would be appropriate as an immediate follow-up study. Third, like all the models with
deterministic prediction, this integrated model also assumes that bargainers' utility functions will remain
unchanged through the bargaining process. Such an assumption may be contradictory to Zartman's (1971, 1976)
argument that a decision is made in bargaining by "changing the parties' evaluation of their values in such a way
as to be able to combine their values into a single package, by persuasion, coercion or force" (Zartman, 1977:
p70). Therefore, the proposed integrated model should be applied with care. For example, one should use a
fixed utility score to predict the ultimate outcome. However, what described above actually is a strength in the
perspective of methodology although a limitation in application. Fourth, the time pressure measure was
manipulated by "trial constraints" and "cost of time". Although such a way of manipulation is widely used and
proved to be effective in social-psychological literature, theoretically, it leads to the measure of time pressure
only to the extent that the ratio of time/trial is constant.
This is only the first step in developing an integrated bargaining model in the marketing context.
Further research effort can be directed to the following issues: (1) The model can be extended by identifying
other relevant social-psychological factors and incorporating these factors into the model. (2) It is also important
to step back to identify the determinants of those social-psychological factors and how they affect the relevant
factors. Bargainers' reservation price and cross-cultural factors are two examples of the potential determinants.
Bargainers' reservation price usually is an interesting and important factor in bargaining issues, while
cross-cultural factors are especially crucial for bargaining in the international marketing context. (3) The potential
interaction effects among these five social-psychological variables as well as between them and some potential
moderating factors, such as trust and expectation for future cooperation, will also be important topics for future
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research. Collecting more data by using a complete factorial design will enable the test of interaction effects
among those factors proposed in the present study. (4) It would also be interesting to relax the assumption of
full information. By providing bargainers incomplete information, we may expect to observe substantial inefficient
agreements and to examine the possible impact of the social-psychological factors on the degree of inefficiency.
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NOTES
1) A cooperative game is a game in which the players can make binding commitments, as opposed to a
noncooperative game, in which they cannot (Rasmusen, 1989: p29).
2) Usually, M is a fixed quantity of some homogeneous good (e.g., a sum of money). For other cases in which
the available amount of a good is variable, unknown, or perhaps not even defined, it is more appropriate to
consider an ordering index P which ranges over the various outcome alternatives, taking, for example, large
values for outcomes which are very favorable to bargainer 1 and small values for outcomes which are very
favorable to bargainer 2. For detail refer to Cross (1969: p43-44, p84-85).
3) For detailed proof of the convergence property of the ratio of expectations, rj/r2 , refer to Cross (1969: p52-55).
4) Cross (1977: p45) argues that "as the anticipated settlement dates approach, uncertainty will decline and payoff
demands will become more reliable indicators of expectations."
5) Integrative bargaining refers to the processes by which high joint benefit is developed by bargainers and
competitive bargaining refers to the processes by which bargainers seek to gain an advantage for the self at the
other's expense (Walton & McKersie, 1965; Pruitt, 1981: pl5 & 137).
6) Pruitt (1981: pll) indicates that the experiments in social-psychological studies of bargaining usually run five
to fifteen pairs of subjects in each cell so that stable averages can be calculated on the measures taken.
7) A pilot study shows that most pairs reached agreement in about 10 rounds of offers under the full information
condition; therefore, 10-round is chosen in the stimulus of high time pressure.
8) These three linear line segments were formed by connecting the eighteen efficient outcomes listed in Table
3. However, alternatives # 1, 2, 17, and 18 were deleted because they were inferior to the no-agreement
outcome.
9) The questions not answered by the two subjects were not so important for the hypotheses testing because
these questions were seven post-bargaining questions designed to measure the subject's satisfaction about the
negotiation result.
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EXHIBIT 1
OPINION QUESTIONNAIRE I
* PLEASE GIVE YOUR ANSWER DIRECTLY TO THE COMPUTER ANSWER SHEET.
For each of the following items, you are asked to evaluate your typical reactions. There is
no right or wrong answer. In each case, think carefully about your past experience and choose the
number which best describes you.
1: Does not describe 7:Describes
me at all me perfectly
1. I tend to hold on to my solution to a problem 12 3 4 5 6 7
2. I generally try to satisfy the needs of other people 12 3 4 5 6 7
3. I am willing to give in to the wishes of other people 12 3 4 5 6 7
4. I argue my case with other people to keep my position 12 3 4 5 6 7
5. I often go along with the suggestions of other people 12 3 4 5 6 7
6. I don't like to concede to other people even under pressure 12 3 4 5 6 7
7. I usually accommodate the expectations of other people 12 3 4 5 6 7
8. I am generally firm in pursuing my side of the issue 12 3 4 5 6 7
9. I dominate arguments until the other person agrees to my position -- 1234567
10. I argue insistently for my stance 12 3 4 5 6 7
11. I seldom assert my opinion forcefully 12 3 4 5 6 7
12. I raise my voice to get another person to accept my position 12 3 4 5 6 7
13. I insist my position be accepted during a conflict 12 3 4 5 6 7
14. I stand firm in my views during a conflict 12 3 4 5 6 7
15. I stress my point by physically display
(e.g., hitting my fist on the table) 12 3 4 5 6 7
16. I am steadfast in my view, refusing to retreat 12 3 4 5 6 7
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EXHIBIT 2
OPINION QUESTIONNAIRE II
Instructions. On the following pages, you will find a series of situations that are likely to
occur in everyday life. The central person in each situation is faced with a choice between two
alternative courses of action, which we might call X and Y. Alternative X is more desirable and
attractive than alternative Y, but the probability of attaining or achieving X is less than that of
attaining or achieving Y.
For each situation on the following pages, you will be asked to indicate the minimum odds
of success you would demand before recommending that the more attractive or desirable
alternative, X, be chosen.
Read each situation carefully before giving your judgment. Try to place yourself in the
position of the central person in each of the situations. There are six situations in all. Please do
not omit any of them.
1. Mr. A, an electrical engineer, who is married and has one child, has been working for a
large electronics corporation since graduating from college five years ago. He is assured of a
lifetime job with a modest, through adequate, salary, and liberal pension benefits upon retirement.
On the other hand, it is very unlikely that his salary will increase much before he retires. While
attending a convention, Mr. A is offered a job with a small, newly founded company which has a
highly uncertain future. The new job would pay more to start and would offer the possibility of a
share in the ownership if the company survived the competition of the larger firms.
Imagine that you are advising Mr. A. Listed below are several probabilities or odds of the
new company's proving financially sound.
Please check the lowest probability that you would consider acceptable to make it worthwhile
for Mr. A to take the new job.
The chances are 1 in 10 that the company will prove financially sound.
.=...„.. The chances are 3 in 10 that the company will prove financially sound.
. xhe chances are 5 in 10 that the company will prove financially sound.
- The chances are 7 in 10 that the company will prove financially sound.
Xhe chances are 9 in 10 that the company will prove financially sound.
——
— Place a check here if you think Mr. A should not take new job no matter what the
probabilities.
2. Mr. D is the captain of College X's football team. College X is playing its traditional
rival, College Y, in the final game of the season. The game is in its final seconds, and Mr. D's
team, College X, is behind in the score. College X has time to run one more play. Mr. D, the
captain, must decide whether it would be best to settle for a tie score with a play which would be
almost certain to work or, on the other hand, should be try a more complicated and risky play which
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